Ukraine's presidential election

Viktory for the blue camp

The election of Viktor Yanukovich is not as surprising as it may seem

Feb 11th 2010 | KIEV | From The Economist print edition

AP

THE big picture in Ukraine often looks clear and dramatic. In the 2004 orange revolution Viktor Yanukovich was the operatic villain. In the cast-list of Ukrainian politics he is a former convict, a stooge of Moscow and a gaffe-prone thug. But in the latest act, on February 7th he became the democratically elected president, winning 49% of the vote, against 45.5% for the defeated prime minister, Yulia Tymoshenko.

Five years ago Mr Yanukovich had been the hand-picked successor to Ukraine’s autocratic leader, Leonid Kuchma, who rigged the election in favour of his protégé but sparked mass protests that brought Viktor Yushchenko and Ms Tymoshenko to power. In the words of Mr Kuchma, the score has now been "annulled”. Mr Yushchenko, who spectacularly failed to govern the country well, has been kicked out. Ms Tymoshenko refuses to concede defeat, causing irritation in the Ukraine and the West. And Mr Yanukovich has (almost) become a champion of democracy.

International observers say the vote was honest, and the result was unaffected by a late amendment to the election law, vote-buying, the use of vanishing ink and four girls stripping naked at one of the polling stations. So while the orange revolution has run out of steam, its democratic legacy endures—even if it has brought Mr Yanukovich’s blue party to power.

But step closer to this scene and the images start to blur; orange and blue merge into grey. Mr Yanukovich’s comeback is exaggerated, largely because he never went away. In 2004 as today, his support came almost exclusively from the Russian-speaking and densely populated industrial east of the country, and the south. His party consistently won more votes than Ms Tymoshenko’s, and he briefly served as prime minister under Mr Yushchenko.

His narrow victory is thanks neither to his talents nor his popularity. The election was not so much won by his blue party as lost by the orange coalition. A deep economic crisis hurt Ms Tymoshenko as a prime minister. And Mr Yushchenko called on his few remaining supporters to vote against his former ally, depriving Ms Tymoshenko of crucial votes.

Ms Tymoshenko is contesting the election in the courts and demanding a recount in Mr Yanukovich’s core regions. Her bet is not that she can change the outcome of the election, but that by exposing violations she will undermine Mr Yanukovich’s legitimacy and energise her supporters for a future political battle. In fact, with turnout lower than usual, and a higher vote choosing the "against all” option, only a third of the electorate cast their ballots for Mr Yanukovich. "The brightest and most active voters don’t want anything to do with either candidate,” says Yuri Levenets, a political scientist.

But though Ukrainians place little trust in Mr Yanukovich, the problems he has to solve are huge. Ukraine has a 12% budget deficit and is struggling to pay pensions and salaries. Lending by the IMF has been frozen, and according to Mr Yanukovich’s team, the only option in the short-term is to print money, which will inevitably fuel inflation (already in double digits).

Mr Yanukovich’s first task is to form a coalition in parliament. He wants to avoid fresh parliamentary elections and will try to win the backing of Mr Yushchenko’s party, which may not come cheap. Mr Yanukovich may appoint a caretaker prime minister, who will implement unpopular reforms, including raising heavily subsidised gas prices, freezing government projects and bringing more of the grey economy into the open to persuade the IMF to restart the lending.

Mr Yanukovich’s government team is stronger than those of Ms Tymoshenko or Mr Yushchenko. It includes competent and Western-trained economists such as Irina Akimova, the likely economics minister. The question, however, is whether this team has sufficient will and power to build institutions, push ahead with structural reforms and curb corruption.

Mr Yanukovich is no visionary reformer. He is the flesh and blood of the rent-seeking and corrupt system of government that has dominated Ukraine ever since its independence in 1991. As a governor of Donetsk he served the interests of his backer, Rinat Akhmetov, Ukraine’s richest man, who emerged the winner from the brutal wars for control of Donetsk steelworks and mines. Yet, paradoxically, it is the interests of people like Mr Akhmetov that could yet force the government to implement reforms. None of the Ukrainian oligarchs secured their assets with kid gloves, but all of them now want to husband what they have and to enhance its value. They argue that property rights, stability and clear rules will increase the stockmarket value of their firms. "We must build an independent judiciary at any cost,” says Boris Kolesnikov, Mr Akhmetov’s associate and a deputy for Mr Yanukovich’s Party of the Regions who was briefly arrested after the orange revolution.

Despite such views, old habits will die hard. The practice of buying judges or appointing prosecutors to safeguard business interests is alive and well. The temptation to bend the rules again to win a valuable asset could prove too much to resist.

The Russian Question

In Moscow Mr Yanukovich’s victory is seen as a victory over the West, and a belated vindication of Vladimir Putin’s decision to back him five years ago. Mr Yanukovich is more at home in Moscow than in Brussels. He will almost certainly offer Russia’s Gazprom (along with a European firm) a deal to form a long-term consortium to operate Ukraine’s gas pipeline system in the hope that this will reduce gas prices and dissuade Moscow from building an alternative pipeline to bypass Ukraine. That said, Mr Yanukovich will zealously guard the interests of Ukraine’s own tycoons, who see their future in the European Union, not in Russia. As one senior Ukranian diplomat put it, "A good relationship with Russia is also what Europe wants from us.”

Ukraine’s politics may be operatic, but do not expect a great redemption or a terrible retribution. The next scene is likely to be a muddle, with the protagonists making the best of a bad job.