Here is how Cristopher Miller describes the “operation” in his book “The War Came to Us”. If you disregard some gloating over the Russian mistakes, on the whole the picture of the war is accurate:

“By mid-March it became clear that Russia’s invasion was for the Kremlin, in fact, a fuck-up of historic proportions.

As the troops rolled into Ukraine, relaxed, sitting on top their armored vehicles, they had been told that they’d meet little or no resistance and would be welcomed as liberators by the Ukrainians. The Russians had no maps to help guide them to Kiev or they used old maps of the city from 1989, which showed them roads that were no longer there, terrain that had long been altered with new towns and infrastructure. They carried little food and no spare clothing items except parade uniforms they believed they’d be wearing as they marched victoriously down Khreshchatyk Street in a few days’ time. And they over-extended their supply lines.

Putin’s troops never adapted to the situation, and instead repeated the same failing tactics over and over, with the same devastating results. They took wrong turns; they tried to punch-throw Ukrainian defenses with huge armored columns, including one more than 40 miles long; and they ran themselves into traps, where Ukrainian troops and volunteer fighters armed with Javelins and NLAWs easily picked them off.’

[Miller, 2023: 297]

The special military operation showed what Russian commentators, philosophers, literary figures and philologists call key concepts of Russian life and culture: irresponsibility and slovenly work at all the levels.

It is only with a passage of time that the Russians regained their victorious spirit that came down on Ukrainians with a vengeance.